Based on forty-nine industry and eight FDA interviews we conducted, we found that industry seeks additional structured and informal interactions with the FDA, especially during Phase II of development. Overall, industry placed greater value on additional communication than did the FDA. Furthermore, industry interviewees indicated that they were willing to pay PDUFA-like fees during clinical development to ensure that the FDA could hire additional, wellqualified staff to assist with protocol reviews and decision-making.
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Major scientific breakthroughs, new discovery technologies, and significant increases in life science R&D spending in both the private sector and at the National Institutes of Health have helped create prospects for the impending discovery and development of significant new medicines to treat unmet health needs. Despite these scientific advances and enhanced R&D efforts, the number of average annual New Drug Applications ("NDAs") and new Biologic License Applications ("BLAs") approved by the US Food and Drug Administration has been smaller after 2000 than in the mid-1990s. 1 Moreover, recent estimates suggest the average costs of bringing a new medicine to market have increased sharply to between $800 million and $1.7 billion, with the lower estimate being two and a half times higher than similar inflation-adjusted estimates published a dozen years earlier. 2 This increase in costs of bringing new medicines to market may be somewhat surprising since, spurred by Congressional legislation, over the last decade review times at the FDA have actually been declining. Specifically, available evidence suggests that the passage and implementation of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act in 1992, and its successors in 1997 and 2002, have resulted in industry and the FDA working together to reduce mean and median NDA/BLA approval review times substantially, by more than 40% across a wide range of therapeutic classes. 3 While the shortening of approval review times at the FDA has resulted in new drugs coming on to the U.S. market more rapidly, other things equal, this FDA review time comprises only a small proportion -about 10% to 15% --of the total time required to discover, develop and market a new medical product.
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The total time in drug development is typically broken down into pre-clinical and clinical stages. Prior to a sponsor filing an Investigational New Drug ("IND") application with the FDA, authorizing clinical testing of a new compound for safety in healthy humans, sponsors typically engage in a pre-clinical drug discovery process that lasts from one to five years. Notably, the time between the IND authorization and the filing of the NDA/BLA is much more lengthy and, unlike the NDA/BLA review process, this interval has become longer rather than shorter. Given that drug development times are much longer than approval review times, and that the former have been increasing rather than falling in recent decades, it is clear that the drug development process merits a close examination. That is the focus of the research reported here, which is based on results from a 2004 survey of 57 senior R&D and regulatory personnel in industry and at the FDA. In particular, we report here the results of a recently completed confidential interview survey project assessing the nature of communications between the FDA and industry during the drug development process, and identifying opportunities to improve the management of this process. The survey results were compiled after conducting interviews with 49 senior R&D/regulatory affairs officials at seven biotech/biopharmaceutical firms, seven pharmaceutical companies, and three contract research organizations ("CROs"). To obtain comparable perspectives from the FDA, we also conducted analogous interviews with eight senior FDA officials.
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Two features of this survey deserve special note. First, the industry officials we interviewed were senior R&D and regulatory personnel, and in particular were not in the financial, marketing or public affairs divisions of these organizations; the views of these R&D and regulatory personnel may differ considerably from managers elsewhere in these company.
Second, all survey interviews were carried out between January 8, 2004 and May 27, 2004 
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The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section II we provide a brief summary of the clinical drug development process, and focus on significant milestones and FDA-industry interactions during this process. In Section III we describe our research methods, while in Section IV we discuss ten sets of survey findings. We comment on related qualitative and "thinking outside the box" de novo responses further in Section V, summarize themes in FDA and industry interviewees' recommendations in Section VI, and note study limitations in Section VII. A more detailed quantitative analysis of our findings, along with a set of appendixes providing further details concerning study design and research methods, are contained in a preliminary draft version of this paper, available upon request from the authors.
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II. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE DRUG DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
The process of basic discovery through new drug approval consists of pre-clinical and clinical development. Its structure, along with typical timelines and a recent estimate of conditional transition and cumulative attrition rates, is summarized in Figure 1 . 6 The preclinical portion of development begins with basic discovery and research and extends through animal testing. Early portions of pre-clinical development consist of scientific in vitro and in vivo experiments and validation of principles and concepts; such research takes place within academic, government and industry laboratories. Generally a lead or candidate compound is first identified and isolated after screening thousands of chemicals/proteins against a specific biological target. Next safety/toxicity animal studies are conducted with this compound. After carrying out extensive pharmacokinetic and pharmacodynamic testing in various animal models, the developing company, known as the sponsor, can file an Investigational New Drug ("IND") application, which must clear the FDA before human testing can commence in the U.S. The Once submitted to the FDA for review, approximately 90% of NDAs/BLAs eventually receive FDA approval and are marketed. Review times now average about one year. When the various between-phase and final approval transition probabilities are multiplied to achieve a cumulative probability, the chance of a leading drug candidate successfully proceeding from preclinical to approval is about 8%; for every 12-13 compounds that were serious candidates in preclinical research, only one drug will make it to market.
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Phase IV trials, also known as post-marketing studies, are in some cases performed as a condition required by the FDA for initial market approval. In other cases they are undertaken to obtain approval for a new indication, or are carried out for marketing purposes. Phase IV studies are designed to observe the (sometimes long-term) effects of a drug in a larger and more heterogeneous population than studied in the Phase III trials. It is not unusual for Phase IV studies to involve thousands of patients; on average, these studies take three to four years, though for some chronic conditions, they can last much longer. Once on the market, new patentprotected drugs typically have 11 to 13 years of market exclusivity before facing generic competition, although they likely face therapeutic competition much earlier.
Because of the long development process (about 7. 
IV. RESULTS FROM THE SURVEY
We now summarize the ten most common and striking findings from our survey, primarily in a qualitative fashion; a more detailed and quantitative discussion is found elsewhere.
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A.
INDUSTRY HAS GUARDED RESPECT FOR THE FDA
At the beginning of each company interview, we asked interviewees to rate the agency's ability to regulate drug development and appropriately weigh the risks and benefits of new drugs.
Industry gave the FDA an average rating of "good", a rating that did not vary significantly across biotech, pharmaceutical and CRO respondents. Qualitative comments from interviewees indicated a great deal of respect for the FDA as a whole and recognition of the challenging role the agency plays in evaluating new drugs.
Although industry's average rating of the FDA's effectiveness at keeping unsafe drugs from the market was even higher (between "good" and "excellent"), follow-on questioning resulted in many respondents qualifying their answers to this question with the comment that the agency was partly responsible for delaying the progress of some very valuable new therapies to market, in some cases being overly vigilant. One global head of R&D stated the agency tended inappropriately to weigh drug development as a "risk-benefit" analysis. Instead, the individual argued, a "risk-risk" analysis would often be more appropriate, since the tradeoff frequently involves comparing the risks of approving a drug having certain safety issues with the risks that patients face without having the therapeutic available as a treatment option. This individual also stated that often it is the risk of the drug being used in inappropriate populations or combination therapies that causes safety concerns and delays at the FDA.
B. PDUFA HAS HAD A SIGNIFICANT BENEFICIAL IMPACT ON APPROVAL TIMES, BUT OTHER TRENDS ARE WORRISOME TO INDUSTRY
Industry interviewees agreed for the most part that the FDA had made significant efforts to reduce drug approval times, but that the amount and impact of efforts by the FDA to reduce clinical development times were modest at best. Responses from the FDA interviewees were qualitatively similar to those from industry.
FDA interviewees acknowledged that in terms of affecting review approval times,
PDUFA had brought about a huge cultural shift at the FDA. As one FDA official put it, "The review process is now a Swiss train, not an Italian train." However, a number of agency officials also acknowledged that the focus on reducing clinical development times was still not universally shared, particularly among reviewing staff. For example, one senior official noted that for decades facilitating reductions in clinical development times had not been perceived as a priority at the FDA, nor perhaps even a role the FDA ought to play. Instead, the traditional attitude of reviewers has been one of asking for whatever data is necessary, without much concern to time delays and costs imposed on the sponsor. Attention to the second mission of the
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FDA -promoting the public health by helping to speed access to new medical innovations -was a relatively recent phenomenon and less universally shared, said another official. On the other hand, both FDA and industry personnel noted that the FDA's recent record on issuing guidance documents was improving, and that these documents (as well as meetings leading up to them) helped reduce uncertainties in the drug development process. Several interviewees specifically identified a recent FDA guidance document involving pediatric clinical investigations as being exemplary.
When asked whether the European Medicines Evaluation Agency ("EMEA") was more efficient than the FDA in approving drugs, about two-thirds of industry interviewees either disagreed or were neutral. One "best practice" of the EMEA cited by several interviewees was its convening of an expert meeting of regulators, sponsors and academics whenever significant developments in a therapeutic area or treatment modality had taken place.
A number of industry interviewees commented that historically, a strength of the FDA has been that its mandate has been limited to evaluating medicines on the basis of scientific criteria, and not on the basis of commercial or reimbursement considerations. Companies' experiences with the EMEA and national health authorities have historically been less satisfactory. Specifically, in Europe both reimbursement and approval decisions were often more deeply intertwined. Others believed that the EMEA's stand on wanting comparative trials (not just placebo controls) was unfortunate, for that implicitly introduced cost and price concerns, rather than a focus on scientific issues involving efficacy. Several interviewees voiced concerns that with passage of the Medicare Drug Benefit legislation and increased collaboration between the FDA and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, this separation of mandates could become more blurred in the U.S. as well.
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C. EXCESSIVE VARIABILITY ACROSS DIVISIONS AT THE FDA
In almost every company interview, respondents indicated that there was a high degree of variability in competence, communications and implementation of rules and regulations across divisions at the FDA. A substantial number of respondents characterized the FDA as being organized like a "cottage industry", where divisions are relatively independent, interacting in highly variable ways with sponsors.
While acknowledging that various divisions in the Center for Drug Evaluation and
Research ("CDER") are engaged in different therapeutic areas and thus would reasonably be expected to have different requirements for establishing safety and efficacy, company interviewees repeatedly stated that the ways and extent to which divisions interact and respond to sponsors is highly variable, from simple matters such as returning phone calls to more complex issues such as feedback on clinical protocols and NDAs/BLAs.
Several divisions were consistently identified by industry as having "best practices" that accelerated the drug development process and made it more predictable. These best practices included the following:
• rapid turnaround of agreement on meeting minutes (in some cases before the end of the meeting, projected onto a screen visible by all);
• invitation by the FDA to the sponsor to make a half-day presentation to the therapeutic division on a novel drug, including a discussion of the underlying science and outcome metrics; and However, several other divisions were identified by interviewees as having "worst practices". Such practices included:
• very poor communication protocols (only willing to discuss issues via letters, and not the telephone);
• extended time delay in resolving issues relative to FDA-sponsor commitments, including multiple changes in previously agreed upon decisions between the sponsor and the FDA;
• ambiguous advice and unwillingness to commit to protocols; and
• preoccupation with minor statistical issues essentially unrelated to therapy evaluation, e.g., a patient's bowel surgery while on an antidepressant.
Agency officials are very much aware of variability in communications protocols across divisions. When asked how sponsor companies would rate the consistency of communications and interactions across therapeutic divisions, FDA interviewees rated these as on average being slightly above poor. One senior agency official stated that an outside consultant had recently been retained to address how best practices could be defined across the FDA's divisions, and what metrics could be put in place to monitor progress. In an initial attempt to address these issues explicitly, in October 2003 the FDA issued a draft guidance document on Good Review Management Principles, designed for both industry and FDA staff. At the time of our interviews in May 2004, apparently this document was in the process of being revised. As an aside, this individual also noted some disagreement with the above-named best practice of the FDA and industry agreeing on minutes at the end of meetings, and perhaps even projecting them on a screen for all to see. One potential problem with that, this individual argued, was that the minutes might be unable adequately to explain why a particular decision had been made. The underlying rationale was often important, and if not memorialized in minutes, with fading memories its absence could complicate downstream negotiations and decision-making, as well as obfuscate applicability to other development projects.
Biotech companies in particular expressed concern over the merger of CBER and CDER, noting that CBER had established a track record of engaging in many of the best practices (quick response to sponsor inquiries, accessibility of reviewers and leadership, proactive interest in the underlying science) which they feared might not be sustained under the auspices of an augmented CDER.
D. MIXED VIEWS ON APPROPRIATE TRAINING OF MEDICAL REVIEWERS
Industry respondents rated the training of medical reviewers after joining the agency (not their previous education or training) as generally being "fair" to "poor". Follow-on questions revealed that in fact industry has relatively little knowledge of the on-the-job and other formal training FDA medical reviewers receive, although several interviewees indicated they had made presentations at an "FDA campus". Numerous company interviewees acknowledged that the FDA medical reviewers have a very difficult job, that many work long hours and likely are underpaid relative to industry employees.
In comparison, FDA respondents rated the ongoing training of their medical reviewers much higher, being on average "good". However, follow-on discussion with FDA officials revealed that while the scientific training of reviewers was generally of high quality, in most cases they had little if any management training. One FDA official noted wryly that since so many of the reviewers were trained as physicians and/or academics, it should not be surprising that their "people skill" and "management skill" sets may be lacking, and that industry might understandably assess them as being of low quality on these dimensions. Another FDA interviewee noted that as part of their training new medical reviewers are required to attend special classes, including courses that focus on critical writing and communication skills, but that most of the learning is still "in-service" or on-the-job training. One division director indicated with satisfaction the use of an annual "West Virginia retreat" that emphasized people skill development, not science education. A strong mentoring program would be most helpful, stated another agency individual, augmented with some formal management education. Citing previous efforts that resulted in "reviewers impervious to management training," one agency official also pointed out that care is needed to ensure that new recruits are not so far along in their careers to be unable to change their working attitudes and habits -particularly if they are physicians.
Differences between industry and FDA officials' perceptions also emerged in response to a related question assessing the quality of FDA reviewers. While the average industry response was in between "fair" and "good", the FDA average rating was significantly higher, between "good" and "excellent".
However, when asked to evaluate the FDA leadership (team leader, deputy division director, and division director) of medical reviewers, industry respondents ranked the leadership considerably higher than the medical reviewers, on average between "fair" and "good". Followon questioning revealed that company interactions with FDA leadership one or more levels above the medical reviewer were generally positive. Industry respondents explained that excellent medical reviewers were likely to become team leaders and move up through the FDA hierarchy, generating higher ratings for the leadership. Another industry official pointed out that over the last five years the FDA had made significant efforts in hiring qualified senior leadership.
As an example, the individual noted that just several years ago the FDA's CBER office hired a distinguished imaging specialist, who has since been moved to CDER; no previous radiopharmaceutical division head had ever been a radiologist.
Industry interviewees expressed significant concern over the turnover rate of medical reviewers at the FDA (particularly in toxicology), and while unable to cite quantitative evidence, a number suggested that turnover at the FDA was higher than in industry for positions of equal responsibility. More importantly, upon turnover of a medical reviewer, companies were often required to revisit numerous previous decisions that had been agreed upon with the agency, causing unnecessary delays (although in some other cases, speeding up reviews when a very senior reviewer with idiosyncratic scientific views finally retired). Several respondents suggested that a formal handoff procedure, involving participation by both FDA reviewers and sponsor, take place whenever a turnover occurs at a critical review level. Companies also acknowledged, however, that in some cases turnover within their regulatory group also delayed drug development. 12 FDA interviewees indicated that in their view turnover at the medical reviewer level had been decreasing, unlike that at the more senior division director level.
E. TENSIONS EXIST WITHIN COMPANIES ON STRATEGIES FOR DEALING WITH THE FDA
Pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies were asked how well they were organized to deal with the FDA. While both biotech and pharmaceutical companies envisaged themselves as on average being "good" in this respect, biotech's self-perceptions were slightly higher than those by pharmaceutical respondents.
Follow-on discussion revealed that an elaborate regulatory group is typically set up within each company, acting as the primary link between the rest of the company and the FDA.
The majority of interviewees indicated that this structure usually works reasonably well.
However, several interviewees noted that pressures from general management and marketing occasionally forced the regulatory group into confrontational situations with the FDA.
Moreover, a substantial number acknowledged that mergers or acquisitions had made interacting with the FDA more difficult, in part because of inconsistent regulatory practices, and different histories and cultures among the new partners in how aggressive or accommodating they should be with the FDA, resulting in delayed internal decision-making. FDA officials concurred, indicating that in their experience, mergers and acquisitions often led to loss of some of the best scientists, disagreements on dosing, labeling and other clinical strategies previously employed by the new partners, and confusion and uncertainty resulting in delayed communications with the FDA.
F. DIVERSITY IN CONFRONTING AND DISAGREEING WITH THE FDA
Industry officials had bimodal responses to questions regarding whether companies were fearful of disagreeing with the agency on protocols; roughly equal numbers "agreed" their company was afraid to push back, or either "disagreed" or "strongly disagreed". Pharmaceutical company interviewees were more likely to agree that their regulatory groups were hesitant to confront the agency, whereas biotech companies indicated they were less fearful to push back on the FDA regarding clinical protocol requirements, although this difference was not quite statistically significant (p-value of no difference, 0.095).
G. INSUFFICIENT DOSING ANALYSES IN PHASE II TRIALS COMMON
Bimodal responses also occurred in regards to whether companies ran additional clinical trials not required by but in anticipation of questions the FDA might ask. Biotech companies were much less likely to run such additional trials, whereas pharmaceutical companies indicated they did. Follow-on discussion revealed that in many cases companies ran additional trials for marketing and/or labeling purposes (including quality of life analyses). While in a strict sense a few of these trials were unnecessary for the approval of the drug based on FDA requirements, some companies indicated they have tended to run additional Phase II trials to ensure they had identified the proper dose effective range, thereby reducing downside risks associated with subsequent Phase III trials.
A substantial number of company interviewees stated that failure to run a sufficient number of Phase II trials to detect the appropriate dose range had been instrumental in causing failures in Phase III. Some acknowledged they had witnessed development programs within their company that progressed too rapidly through Phase II in order to get to Phase III, perhaps due to demands and pressures from the investment community to show progress in reaching the next targeted development milestone.
Many of the issues raised by industry were also voiced by FDA officials, particularly those involving rather hurried Phase II trials and insufficiently extensive dosing analyses.
Several FDA interviewees identified the industry's tendency to focus excessively on once daily dosing regimens, for in some cases that simply was unlikely to be efficacious; in one failed Phase III study with a once-daily dosing, for example, the half-life of the drug was only four hours, and the drug was cleared before exerting any significant therapeutic effect.
H. VALUATIONS OF EXISTING AND ADDITIONAL COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE FDA VARY SYSTEMATICALLY EXCEPT IN PHASE II
Companies were asked to rate the quality of their current communications with the FDA The assessments of quality of current communications between sponsors and the FDA were much more uniform for Phase II, but this uniform rating was not a stellar one. Both biotech and pharmaceutical companies rated the quality of their current interactions during Phase II as being on average between fair and good, as did the FDA. A consistent theme in cases where industry rated communications as "fair" was the perceived variability in communications, ranging from extremely poor to excellent, across the FDA's therapeutic divisions. Follow-on discussion with FDA interviewees suggested that the FDA was aware of this variability in communications quality with industry across the FDA's divisions during the early development phases. One FDA official noted that the FDA had relatively little experience in the discovery stage, although it has about 250 pre-IND meetings annually with sponsors.
Viewed from both industry and FDA perspectives, the quality of current communications between industry and the FDA was generally higher during the later development phases than in earlier stages. During Phase III, both the FDA and overall industry rated the quality of these communications as being close to "good"; similarly, FDA and overall industry perceptions
were that the quality of communications during the NDA/BLA review stage was "good". .
To examine the importance of milestone meetings with the FDA, companies were asked to rate the value of the consultation at the end of Phase II, prior to Phase III. At this meeting decisions are often made on scoping out final details for the design of and endpoints used in the pivotal Phase III trials. Biotech and pharmaceutical respondents uniformly rated this consultation as being on average close to "very valuable".
Notably, while both pharmaceutical and biotech companies find the end of Phase II meeting to be very valuable, earlier we reported they also rate the quality of current interactions during Phase II as only on average being "fair". Follow-on discussion suggested that industry believed that significant opportunities exist for higher quality communications during this key drug development phase. Some industry interviewees suggested that instituting a user fee "valuable" and "very valuable", mean FDA valuations were either "ambivalent" or in between "ambivalent" and "valuable".
However, a striking result is that only during Phase II do industry's and the FDA's valuations of increased informal communications match each other -both rating these between "valuable" and "very valuable". Notably, FDA interviewees apparently believe that the value of additional informal communications is much higher in Phase II than during other drug development stages. Follow-on discussion with FDA interviewees revealed their belief that Phase II dosing issues were critical, and that a more formalized and extensive Phase IIA meeting, scheduled at the time the first data on dosing become available, would be very useful.
The FDA's experience is that at this stage of the drug development process, there is frequently a tension between the sponsor's "academic science" and "commercial interests", and that a more formalized discussion and review of initial pharmacokinetic and dosing data could help to clarify development issues. At that meeting, FDA officials envisaged an increasingly important role for clinical pharmacological analyses. Waiting until the end of the Phase II studies was often too late, they argued, for by then sponsors had often made up their minds on dosing ranges for the subsequent Phase III pivotal studies. Another FDA interviewee noted that currently a Phase IIA guidance paper was being drafted and discussed with industry, which it was hoped would help sponsors deal more preemptively with dosing issues.
Our survey indicated further that industry was willing to put its money where its mouth is. Specifically, to assess the strength of their desire for increased communications, industry interviewees were asked whether their companies would be willing to pay more for communication with the FDA during various development phases to help the FDA strengthen and expedite clinical development reviews, and to facilitate discussions on various regulatory issues by hiring additional staff. For Phase I, 70% of respondents indicated they would be willing to pay PDUFA types fees ranging between $100K and $500K, while 30% would be willing to pay between $500K and $1 million. Although 10% of respondents were unwilling to pay any PDUFA-type fees during Phase II, about 40% were willing to pay between $100K and $500K, another 40% were willing to pay between $500K and $1 million, and 10% were willing to pay more than $1 million. Finally, while 30% of respondents were unwilling to pay and PDUFA-type fees for Phase III, 40% were willing to pay between $100K and $1 million, and 30% were willing to pay between $1 million and $5 million. In none of the three phases was there any statistically significant difference between pharmaceutical and biotech companies, although during Phase III pharmaceutical company willingness to pay tended to be greater than that by biotech firms.
These findings on the willingness of both biotech and pharmaceutical companies to pay additional user fees underscore the industry's perceived importance of participating in additional quality communications with the FDA. In some instances, however, follow-on discussion revealed that certain companies were hesitant to commit to paying additional user fees unless they could be assured any incremental funds would in fact be used to hire additional staff devoted to improving communications between the FDA and sponsor, and that metrics would be put in place to measure and monitor the incremental hiring and review efforts.
Although on average FDA officials valued additional informal communications in the early development phases less highly than did industry, several FDA interviewees believed there were substantial differences across companies in the likely benefits of such additional communications, with small and less experienced companies being most likely to benefit. One interviewee stated that "Pfizer doesn't need it", and then added, "Merck has three people who have been to more FDA meetings than I have." Industry interviewees had a bimodal response to whether their company would be willing to use surrogate markers under current FDA guidelines, with 50% indicating they were "somewhat likely" or "very likely" vs. 50% being "ambivalent", "not likely" or "very unlikely".
In cases where interviewees indicated they were "very likely" to use a surrogate marker, they
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typically also stated that they were attempting to validate the surrogate marker simultaneously with their ongoing clinical trials, or were employing a marker previously "accepted" by the FDA (e.g., CD4+ T-cell counts for AIDS).
Given the challenges in validating surrogate markers, we then inquired whether economic incentives, such as that from patent protection, would induce companies to engage in additional development and validation of surrogate markers. While the average response was essentially "somewhat likely", this was the only question where we observed statistically significant differences by interviewee rank; the more senior management (executive vice presidents and higher) believed their company would be less likely to employ surrogate markers if patent protection were available, whereas those with rank of vice-president or lower stated their company would be more likely to do so. Interestingly, while CRO interviewee responses (which we classified separately from industry and FDA) were generally indistinguishable from those of industry on most issues, each of the (admittedly small number of) CRO interviewees indicated they would be "very likely" to employ and validate surrogate markers were patent opportunities available.
Follow-on discussion diverged widely. Several interviewees in both pharmaceutical and biotech companies stated that it would not be in the interests of the research community, public health or even in the long-term interest of their company if surrogate markers could be patented, for that could impede use of critical research tools in their subsequent drug development efforts.
Rather than patenting the marker, a number of interviewees suggested an extension of market exclusivity (such as that granted for pediatric indications), in exchange for placing the biomarker in the public domain, freely available for use by other researchers and developers.
MIT-FDA-Industry White Paper
29
Additional discussion indicated great hesitancy on the part of interviewees to rely on surrogate markers given current FDA guidelines and practices. While numerous interviewees indicated that biomarkers were extensively and increasingly used within their company to evaluate safety concerns or to assist in "go/no go" decisions, in most development programs traditional and already-accepted clinical endpoints still trumped biomarkers as efficacy and safety endpoints.
J. DISAGREEMENT ON THE VALUE OF FDA ADVISORY BOARD PANEL MEETINGS
FDA division directors appoint advisory board members in different therapeutic areas to assist them in decision-making. The most public context in which advisory panels provide advice to the FDA is in the final stages of the NDA/BLA review process, after the FDA has had time to review and assess data from the application. Advisory board panel meetings are public and typically webcast. In most cases the sponsor initially makes a presentation, next the FDA summarizes its analyses, patients' advocacy groups make testimonials, advisory board panel members ask questions and finally, the advisory board panel votes on whether to recommend to the FDA that the application be approved. In most but not all cases, the FDA agrees with the panel's recommendations. Notably, while the FDA advisory board panels are not involved in the clinical development component of drug development, they do in fact play a key role in the drug approval process.
Industry is sharply divided in its valuation of this advisory process and panel meeting.
On average, industry was "ambivalent" in its evaluation, with there being no systematic differences among pharmaceutical and biotech respondents. However, interviewees at the FDA rated this process much more favorably, on average in between "valuable" and "very valuable".
CROs tended to agree more with the FDA than with industry on this issue.
Proponents of the advisory panel process indicated that it was a critical point in the NDA/BLA process that allowed the public and practitioner physicians to evaluate the drug, as well as witness the FDA at work. Detractors were critical of the advisory board process in no uncertain terms. Several interviewees likened the process with colorful descriptors as such "circus", "crap shoot" and "dog and pony show." Behind their colorful rhetoric, however, interviewees expressed great concern over the confrontational nature of the hearings. According to several companies that have had very successful approval hearings, yet are sharply critical of the process, the meeting is set up with the sponsoring company on one side, the FDA on the opposite side, and the advisory board as the adjudicator. Some interviewees noted that in communications with FDA officials prior to the panel meeting, the FDA voiced generally favorable evaluations, yet at the public hearing the FDA voiced primarily antagonistic views.
Industry interviewees indicated that substantial amounts of money and time are spent preparing for the "show." One company said that in preparation for this meeting, it prepared 1000 backup slides, while another claimed the number to be 1200. These meeting preparations are highly labor-intensive. While agreeing that the public is entitled to learn about the NDA/BLA details given current Federal regulations (although also acknowledging that what is publicly disclosed at a meeting attended by competitors raises strategic issues for sponsors), and that it is important the public see the FDA at work, industry officials often argued that the current process does not do proper service to the sponsor or the FDA.
Several interviewees, who previously were high-level FDA personnel prior to joining industry, stated that panel experts are often poorly prepared for the review, "reading the material on the plane ride to the FDA." These respondents argued that given that the review process takes many FDA personnel several months, it is improbable that a panelist could gain sufficient understanding to render an appropriately informed decision after only a few hours of review time.
A substantial portion of industry respondents voiced concern over the qualifications of advisory panel members, indicating that more qualified experts were often excluded due to implementation of "excessively restrictive" conflict of interest regulations. Several interviewees stated that the panel meeting environment brought out some of the worst type of behavior by academic panel members, enabling them to "toot their horn and spout off useless remarks."
From the perspective of several industry respondents, the FDA was eminently wellqualified to make the decision on whether to approve the NDA/BLA, following its typically extensive and thorough review of all the safety and efficacy data, and that advisory board panel meetings were unnecessary. When controversial issues emerge, they argued, a better way of managing disagreements or uncertainties would be to have another government agency such as the NIH convene a forum attended by leading experts (even those with company affiliations), the FDA, industry, and academic personnel. It was not uncommon for these types of discussions to move to the more general qualitative issues of how dispute resolution could be better handled at the FDA. Later on we comment on this issue further.
While on average FDA interviewees viewed the advisory board panel process more favorably than industry, agency officials were aware of problems, and had some suggestions for Finally, a common theme that emerged from follow-on discussions with industry was that these advisory board panel meetings provided the FDA and industry a unique opportunity to educate the public (and the FDA staff) on the importance of risk management in the drug regulatory process -not just the safety and toxicity risks from using the new drug, but also the risks to patients if access to this new medicine is denied or delayed. Up to now, industry and senior FDA staff have not seized the opportunity to demonstrate at these public forums the utility of the concept of employing "reasonable risk" as an approval criterion. Rather, the public has been led to believe that drugs can and should be "absolutely safe," which industry believes is in Third, a persistent theme we heard from industry interviews (and to some extent, also from the FDA) was that communications processes with the FDA needed to be better managed.
Increased communication and interactions with the FDA were viewed by industry as substantially increasing information transparency and reducing information asymmetry between the FDA and sponsors, thereby mitigating development uncertainty and risk, making the inherently risk drug development process more predictable. To be effective, however, these increased communications efforts must be coupled with standard performance metrics and best practices across the FDA's therapeutic divisions. Currently industry believes there is enormous variability across the FDA's 17 therapeutic divisions and areas in the quality of communications between the FDA and industry.
Both industry and FDA respondents recognized the existence of an inherent tension, however, between credibly regulating an industry and working with it to facilitate development of innovative products, i.e., between gate-keeping and development. FDA officials expressed particular strong caution that their supportive role be confined to collaboration, and not include extensive partnering. A delicate balance must be maintained between attempting to accommodate industry's desires to know and the agency's need to safeguard its decision-making process. That being said, both industry and the FDA recognize that later phase information communications are by necessity likely to be more constrained than those possible at earlier stages of the drug development process. The uniformly high valuation of additional Phase II informal communications voiced both by FDA and industry may signal that such efforts will be forthcoming. However, the discordant FDA-industry valuations of such additional communications during the earlier drug development phases are notable. Both industry and FDA officials stated that these issues merit careful consideration as the FDA carries out its "Critical Pathways" initiatives with industry, academia, other government agencies, and the public.
Finally, our "de novo" questions also yielded several less commonly voiced opinions.
Among these were the following:
• Redefine the medical reviewer position at the FDA and mix it in with service at the NIH and CDC. Make the job description more attractive, and perhaps institute a fellowship program.
• Involve the medical associations more in the review process, particularly during the advisory board panel meeting.
• Have one toxicology unit serve all therapeutic divisions. More generally, the various therapeutic divisions are aligned too separately as silos, and instead there needs to be more cross-division consultation.
• Make the FDA more distant from the political process. The Commissioner of the FDA should be just as independent of the executive and legislative branches as is the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve.
• Split regulatory supervision of food and agriculture off from the FDA, making it focused only on the safety and efficacy of medicines. Asking senior staff to be conversant with such wide-ranging issues involving food and drugs is practically unreasonable.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS: THEMES FROM QUALITATIVE DISCUSSIONS
The less structured qualitative portions of our confidential interviews with 49 industry and eight senior FDA officials repeatedly focused on a number of suggested policy recommendations, which interviewees believed could lead to improved regulatory interactions between industry and the FDA and make the drug development and regulatory process more efficient, without compromising patient safety and welfare. Among those voiced most frequently and with the greatest intensity wee the following:
• Institute metrics and goals analogous to those present in the Prescription Drug User Fee Acts of 1992, 1997 and 2002 into the drug development portion of interactions with the agency. Sponsor companies would be charged reasonable levels of user fees for increased interactions during Phases II and III, not just upon submitting for review approval a New Drug Application or a Biologic License Application. The funds from sponsors would be used to hire additional, well qualified FDA staff to increase the interactions and information flows with sponsors.
• Contract with an independent consultant to identify divisions that are managed well, and that have been successful in fulfilling both portions of the FDA mission statement.
Implement and regularly monitor the diffusion of standard best practices from the topperforming divisions across the entire set of agency divisions. Report on progress of the diffusion of best practices across therapeutic areas in the PDUFA annual report.
• Establish an oversight board consisting of industry, agency officials, and premier external scientists (possibly at NIH or CDC), that convenes at a minimum once a year to evaluate retrospectively the development and regulatory history of a randomly selected number of completed and terminated drug development projects -both successful and failed. This group would provide feedback to the FDA and industry and present actionable recommendations to improve the regulatory and development process.
• Establish an exchange program involving industry and FDA scientists that exposes industry to the FDA and vice-versa. To mitigate subsequent potential conflicts of interest, the FDA scientists would need to function in an industry project outside the review domain of the division employing them at the FDA.
• Collaborate on creating a more structured and effective dispute resolution system. The current ombudsman system is rarely, if ever used, and informal processes are inconsistent, creating unnecessary uncertainty and delaying decision-making.
• Establish a knowledge data base, using modern information technology, that stores and makes available information on issues concerning classes of compounds and molecule structures. Because the FDA is de facto the custodian of a knowledge base encompassing a much wider range of molecules and safety issues than is known by any in industry, it has a unique opportunity to provide developers with important information concerning safety and efficacy. These data could also be used in simulations and modeling involving safety and toxicity issues, projected both backwards and forwards. Certain proprietary and intellectual property issues will need to be addressed to facilitate the sharing of such information. However, allowing companies in ignorance to conduct clinical trials with compounds that share similar important properties with compounds that have previous safety or toxicity failures is inconsistent with protecting the public health.
Finally, we believe it important to bear in mind that issues involving interactions between the The sample of companies interviewed during this research was not chosen at random from a listing of biotech, pharmaceutical, and CRO companies. It was important for the purpose of the research to interview personnel at companies that had considerable experience with the FDA and drug development. The companies we chose to interview were admittedly nonrandom, and quite successful -as of April 2004, they had a total market capitalization of more than one trillion dollars. A random sampling of companies engaged in drug development would not have ensured coverage of companies with significant development experience. While not proven, we believe that the sample is representative of the major stakeholders of drug development within industry.
Virtually all the industry interviewees were engaged in R&D or regulatory activities.
General management and senior executives (e.g. chief executive officer, chief financial officer)
were not interviewed. Their opinions on interactions with and evaluations of the FDA might be very different given the greater pressure they face from the investment community and shareholders.
Similarly, the eight senior FDA officials interviewed may not be representative of the entire leadership at the FDA. While the names of several of the FDA interviewees were provided by the study team, the majority of the eight FDA interviewees were selected by the FDA. 
